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Aristotle appears to make the following claims about the end of morally 
virtuous action: 
(1) Virtuous action is chosen for its own sake. 
(2) Virtuous action is chosen for the sake of suSocijiovia. 
(3) Virtuous action is chosen for the sake of the noble. 
(4) Virtuous action is chosen for the sake of contemplation.1 
Understanding Aristotle's ethical theory requires understanding how 
these four characterizations of the end of virtuous action fit together. 
Much contemporary work on this subject proceeds as if these four claims 
could be reduced to two: 
1 Texts giving prima facie evidence for these claims: (1) EN 1105a33; (2) EN 1097b2-5; 
(3) EN 1115MM3,1116311-12,1117a8,1120a23-4,1122b6-7, EE 122938,1230a27; (4) 
EN 1145a6-ll, 1177bl-15, EE 1249b6-23. 
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(1) Virtuous action is chosen for its own sake. 
(4) Virtuous action is chosen for the sake of contemplation. 
This reduction is made by arguing that choosing something for its own 
sake just is choosing it for the sake of e\>5ai}iovia, and by tacitly 
assuming that choosing something for its own sake is equivalent to 
choosing it for the sake of the noble.2 Concerning the remaining two 
claims, some scholars declare an inconsistency in Aristotle's ethical 
writings, while others, pointing to the fact that for Aristotle a thing may 
be chosen both for its own sake and for the sake of something else, 
argue that virtuous action (sometimes, often, or always) is chosen not 
only for its own sake but also for the sake of contemplation. Those 
taking the latter approach differ as to whether the ends of virtuous 
action and contemplation may ever conflict in Aristotle's view, and, if 
they do, how he thinks such conflicts should be decided.3 
The family of interpretations described in the preceding paragraph 
agree in holding that virtuous action has a nature and worth inde-
pendent of any relation it may have to contemplation, so that choosing 
it for its own sake does not entail choosing it for the sake of contem-
plation. The interpretation here proposed denies that claim; I shall 
argue that for Aristotle a complete account of the nature and value of 
virtuous action makes reference to contemplation, and that therefore 
choosing virtuous action for its own sake involves choosing it because 
of its relation to contemplation.4 Contemplation constitutes, in a sense 
2 The equivalence of (1) and (2) is the underlying idea of the general family of 
interpretations known as 'inclusivism', the original representatives of which in-
clude Ackrili (1974/1980), Cooper (1975), Irwin (1978), Nussbaum (1986). In these 
earlier writings little attention is paid to the role of 'the noble' in Aristotle's theory. 
Irwin (1985), 127 makes noble goods a proper subset of intrinsically worthwhile 
goods, arguing, from a passage in Rhetoric 19, that noble goods are those intrinsically 
worthwhile goods which benefit others. Engberg-Pedersen (1983), 40 offers a similar 
interpretation of the noble, as does White (1992), 273 n.4. Rogers (1993) cogently 
rehearses the objections to such an interpretation. 
3 The schema of possibilities is laid out by Keyt (1978). 
4 In Aristotelian terms, one can say that the moral virtues stand, as goods, in a 7ipo<; 
ev relationship to the 'focal' good of contemplation. I should point out that it is not 
part of my view that the virtuous agent explicitly looks to contemplation as he 
decides how to act. He looks to the noble, which, however, gets its content from its 
relationship to contemplation. 
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to be explained, an indirect standard for virtuous action. The connecting 
link between virtuous action's being chosen for its own sake (1) and 
its being chosen for the sake of contemplation (4) is provided by the 
notion of its being chosen for the sake of the noble (3). As Aristotle 
tells us at Metaphysics 1078a37-bl (discussed below), the noble (beau-
tiful, fine: TO KOCXOV), in general consists in a certain determinateness, 
a determinateness that is presumably appropriate to the specific sort 
of thing that is to be KOCA,OV. That determinateness for the sake of which 
virtuous action is chosen is a certain determinate state of the soul, the 
value of which, I shall argue, is derived from its relation to contem-
plation. Furthermore, since virtuous action, in being chosen for the 
sake of the noble, is chosen for the sake, ultimately, of contemplation, 
we are able to construe e\)5ai|iovia in claim (2) above as e\)8ai|iov{a in 
the primary sense, that is, as contemplation. 
On this interpretation, then, all characteristically human activities, 
including those that are actualizations of moral virtue, derive their 
nature, in part,5 from their relation to the one highest human activity, 
contemplation. One of the advantages of this interpretation is that it 
brings Aristotle's theory of human activity into line with his metaphys-
ics, according to which there should be some single, unitary activity, 
the active potentiality for which is the essence of a natural substance, 
and from which all other activities characteristic of that substance are 
in some way derived. Any interpretation which recognizes a plurality 
of distinct, (onto-)logically unrelated activities as together constituting 
the highest human good runs the risk of making Aristotelian ethics 
incompatible with the unity of substance central to Aristotelian meta-
physics. 
My argument will proceed as follows. First, I discuss the alleged 
independence of Aristotelian virtuous action from contemplation. The 
person of practical wisdom (i.e., the <ppovijKx;), I argue, employs certain 
5 This qualification is necessary because many human activities — perhaps all but 
contemplation — will be explained by reference both to the highest, essential human 
activity and to the constraints imposed by matter. In his biological works Aristotle 
emphasizes the need to take into account both formal and material factors in 
explaining the activities of natural substances; he designates these factors by the 
expressions 'the good' and 'the necessary'. See Parts of Animals I I . For the relevance 
of material constraints in understanding the place of activities other than contem-
plation in human life, see Aristotle's brief remarks at £N 1154b20-31. 
132 Thomas M. Tuozzo 
general principles, each corresponding to one of the moral virtues, as 
the starting points for moral deliberation. These general principles are 
not mere rules of thumb (although they do hold only 'for the most 
part'); rather, it is a necessary condition of an action's being a virtuous 
action that it be in accordance with one such rule. Furthermore, I shall 
show that for Aristotle these general principles themselves require a 
standard that helps determine their content, and that Aristotle explicitly 
tells us that that standard is contemplation. After explaining how 
contemplation functions as that standard, I raise the question of the 
degree to which Aristotle's discussion of the particular moral virtues 
and vices coheres with what I have argued to be his general account 
of moral virtue. Lastly I consider the problem of how contemplation 
can serve as the moral standard for persons incapable of contemplation, 
and conclude with some more general reflections on the structure of 
Aristotle's ethical theory and its contemporary relevance. 
I The Alleged Autonomy of Virtuous Action in Aristotle 
At EN 1113a29-33 Aristotle writes as follows: 
The upstanding person (o onov&aicx;) judges each class of things cor-
rectly, and in each what is true is apparent to him. For things that are 
noble and pleasant are peculiar to each state of character, and perhaps 
the upstanding person differs most [from others] in that he sees the true 
in each case, being as it were their yardstick and measure (KCXV&V KCCI 
JJLETpOv).6 
1 shall assume, as do most interpreters of Aristotle, that the judgment of 
the good or upstanding person does not in itself bestow nobility and 
pleasantness on things, but rather correctly discerns the things that are 
truly noble and pleasant independently of the good person's judgment. 
Now there are two possible views of the role of general rules in the good 
person's discernment of the noble and pleasant: either those rules do the 
6 All translations are modifications, ranging from slight to extensive, of the revised 
Oxford translation: Bames (1984). 
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main evaluative work while deliberation, guided by a trained perceptual 
capacity, works out the upshot of those rules for the situation at hand; 
or such rules are mere rules of thumb, in principle dispensable, while the 
discerning of the noble takes place essentially at the level of particular 
perceptual judgment. 
Many scholars hold that for Aristotle the discernment of value takes 
place at the level of particulars, with general rules serving only as rules 
of thumb.7 This interpretation, which derives some apparent support 
from Aristotle's position that general rules in ethics hold only 'for the 
most part' (coq &k\ TO 7ioA,-6), often takes on a late-Wittgensteinian cast: 
the possession of a concept need not involve possession of a rule or 
set of rules fully specifying its application — indeed, such specification 
is impossible — but rather is manifest in successful practice of a 
language-game in which that concept figures.8 Now such interpreta-
tions are right in stressing that for Aristotle there is no set of rules that 
fully specify the application of such moral concepts as 'courageous7, 
'temperate', etc. They are wrong, however, in holding that there are 
no principles corresponding to these moral terms that are prior to the 
particular moral actions which manifest them. The person of practical 
wisdom possesses certain general principles which he applies to par-
ticular circumstances. These principles neither fully specify their ap-
plication — deliberative and perceptual ability play irreducible roles 
— nor are they mere rules of thumb. They give the essential starting 
points for all moral deliberation; possession of them is in part consti-
tutive of being virtuous. 
7 M. Nussbaum has been an influential defender of this view. See Nussbaum (1986): 
'[RJules and universal principles are guidelines or rules of thumb: summaries of 
particular decisions, useful for purposes of economy and aids in identifying salient 
features of the particular case' (299); '[U ]ni versa 1 statements are posterior in ethical 
value to concrete descriptions, universal rules to particular judgments' (301). Also 
see Nussbaum (1978), 210-19 and Louden (1986/1991), 163. Among philosophers in 
the continental tradition the most influential holder of this position has been 
Gadamer (1990), 312-24, recently followed by Dunne (1993). 
8 The influence of the later Wittgenstein on this interpretation of Aristotle is made 
explicit by MacDowell (1979), 336-42. See also the Wittgensteinian coloring of 
Woods (1986), 160: '[Aristotle's] point is that, in this (i.e., in the practical] case, the 
universal is nothing over and above the particular instances, in that there is nothing 
more to grasping the universal than being able to identify instances of the specific 
sorts that comprise i t ( e m p h a s i s in original). 
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The defense of this interpretation may take its start from Aristotle's 
definition of moral virtue at EN 1106b36-7a2: 
Virtue is a state concerned with choice, consisting in a mean state (ev 
p.£0OTT|Ti ovca) relative to us, a mean state determined by Xoyo<; (capia-
\ievr\ AxSyco), [the AxSyo<;] by which9 the person of practical wisdom (o 
(ppovipxx;) would determine it. 
Should we translate Aoyco in this passage by 'reason', referring either to 
the rational faculty of the practically wise person or to its functioning 
(i.e., the process of reasoning),10 or should we translate by something like 
'principle' or 'rule'?11 Stocks pointed out long ago that the dative with 
<bpio[ievfl would be most naturally taken to refer to the standard or 
criterion by reference to which something is determined, and not to the 
agent, judge, psychic faculty, or process that performs the determina-
tion.12 Furthermore, as Stocks also pointed out, Aristotle seldom, if ever, 
in the ethical works uses X & y o c , to refer to a psychic capacity. There are, 
however, more substantive reasons to resist the translation of AxSycp here 
as 'reason', and, since this translation has recently found much favor, it 
is important to draw attention to them. 
In the definition quoted above, virtue is said to be a state ev fieaornxi 
ovaa, that is, consisting in a mean state. This mean state must be 
distinguished from the intermediate (TO jxeaov) which is aimed at and 
chosen by the virtuous person when he or she acts: the former is the 
9 Reading cp. If one takes the other reading, ox^ translate: 'in the way that. .Translat-
ing Xoycx; by 'reason' requires the reading ax;. 
10 This is the translation adopted by Urmson in the revised Oxford translation, as well 
as by Irwin (1985b) in his translation; a similar view of the passage is shared by many 
contemporary writers. Earlier proponents of this view include Greenwood (1909), 
166-7 and Cook-Wilson (1913). 
11 This view is reflected in Ross's original Oxford translation, and is defended by 
Burnet (1914) and more fully by Joachim (1951) ad loc. Woods (1992) adopts the 
translation 'rule' for Xoycx; at EE 1249b4, where, as I shall argue, Aristotle is 
concerned to explicate the X&ycx; that figures in his definition of moral virtue. 
12 Stocks (1914), 9: 'When the passive voice of opi^eiv is joined with a noun in the 
dative, that noun is never the defining faculty, or judge, or legislator, but rather the 
standard, or measure, or mark, by which the definition is effected...' 
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psychic state that disposes one to seek the latter.13 If this is so, then there 
is strong reason to think that the Xoyoq referred to in the definition of 
virtue is not concerned with action in a particular situation. For what is 
determined by AxSyoq here is the mean state that courage, say, or temper-
ance consists in; not what is courageous or temperate on a particular 
occasion. The belief that Aristotle is concerned with reasoning in particu-
lar circumstances in this passage is very widespread indeed among 
interpreters of the Ethics,™ and perhaps explains the tendency to take 
A,6yo<; to refer to the capacity to reason or the process of reasoning. But 
since XxSyoq in this passage determines the jieaoxrjq that is virtue, not the 
particular act that counts as the neaov in a particular situation, Aristotle 
cannot intend Xoycx; to refer here to reasoning as to how to act in a 
particular situation. 
What, then, does AxSyoq refer to in the definition of moral virtue? First 
of all, we must realize that the definition is a general one that should 
apply to each of the moral virtues. Each moral virtue is a capacity to 
choose the intermediate in a certain sphere of human experience:15 
eating, drinking and having sex; fighting in battle; engaging in business 
transactions; entertaining friends; etc. In each sphere the appropriate 
virtue makes one capable of performing an array of widely varying 
actions (e.g., attacking, retreating, standing ground in battle), all of 
which have the same goal, which is the noble or the fine (TO KCXAOV) in 
that sphere. The noble-in-battle is the general goal which different 
courageous actions aim to achieve in different particular circum-
stances.16 Indeed, it is the 'for-the-sake-of-which', the end (xeXoq), of the 
virtue courage, as Aristotle tells us at EN 1115bll-13: '[The courageous 
person] will fear [things frightful for human beings], but he will endure 
them as is necessary and as the principle (Aoyoc;) [says], for the sake of 
the noble (xov kolXov EVCKa); for this [sc. the noble] is the end (xeAxx;) of 
virtue.' This passage suggests the following more general interpretation: 
13 See EN 1106b27-S: 'Virtue is a mean state, since it aims at the intermediate/ 
14 See, for example, Rowe (1971), 111. 
15 I adopt the notion of 'spheres of experience' from Nussbaum (1988), 35. 
16 Thus the noble-in-battle is the intermediate which the courageous person aims at and, 
when particularized by deliberation, chooses. Cf. EN 1113a2-4: 'What is deliberated 
upon and what is chosen are the same thing, except that what is chosen is already 
determinate/ 
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in the statement 'virtue consists in a mean state determined by Xjoyoq', 
Xoyoq refers in each case to a principle expressing the end specific to each 
particular virtue: namely, the noble in the relevant sphere of human life. 
Each virtue is an orientation of certain emotional and desiderative 
capacities towards the noble in some such sphere, an orientation express-
ible by a Aoyoq enjoining action for the sake of the noble-in-that-sphere. 
Furthermore, virtue is not just a desiderative orientation expressible by 
a Aoyo<;; it is a desiderative orientation that brings with it a conscious 
awareness of that taSyoc;, which the agent may use as the first premise of 
his deliberation in situations requiring deliberation.17 
The general principles stating the ends of the various moral virtues, 
then, play an important role in Aristotle's ethical theory. What are they, 
and why does Aristotle never give us a clear statement of them? Given 
the foregoing discussion, it is fairly easy to formulate these general 
principles. They are to state the end or goal to be attained in each of the 
spheres corresponding to the moral virtues. Now the end in a sense 
always stays the same, namely, the noble; what changes is the sphere of 
experience in which that end is pursued. Accordingly we may frame the 
first principles of the Aristotelian virtues as follows: 
Courage: Endure life-threatening battle conditions for the sake of 
the noble. 
Temperance: Satisfy desires for food and sex for the sake of the 
noble. 
Liberality: Spend your wealth on others for the sake of the noble. 
Etc. 
If moral first principles take this form, then it is understandable that 
Aristotle does not present us with a list of them; it is a trivial matter to 
extract them from his discussions of the various moral virtues, which 
specify both the end of the virtues (the noble) and the specific arenas of 
the different virtues. It may be objected that these principles are empty, 
absent any account of what the noble consists in; indeed, they seem to 
derive their susceptibility to this criticism from the discussions from 
17 Thus Aristotle insists that moral virtue is not just a state raxa xov opOov Xoyov ('in 
accordance with the correct principle', EN 1103b32,1144b23), but rather a state jiexa 
xox> opOov AxSyou ('with the correct principle', EN 1144b27). 
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which they are extracted, which have sometimes been thought to require 
a more substantial account of the noble than Aristotle there gives us.18 It 
is certainly going too far to say that Aristotle's discussions of the moral 
virtues are empty, but it is true that they, and the principles I have drawn 
from them, leave a gap which only an account of the noble can fill. 
Indeed, Aristotle explicitly acknowledges this in EN VI1, and provides 
the requisite account of the noble in EE VIII 3. These passages are 
discussed in the next section. I shall close this section by showing how 
moral first principles, as conceived above, may be prior to judgments 
about particular moral actions while nevertheless holding only 'for the 
most part'. 
If moral first principles have the form suggested, then it will be 
possible for a particular situation to fall under more than one principle. 
A certain situation (e.g., receiving an inheritance) may seem to be an 
occasion to act liberally (entertaining friends) as well as an occasion to 
act justly (repaying a debt). The person of practical wisdom will be 
capable of perceiving which virtue is called for in that situation,19 and 
will accordingly deliberate from the correct moral principle.20 Moral 
principles are said to hold 'for the most part' because it is true for any 
one of them that sometimes, though it could be followed, it should not 
be. The rules themselves are not to blame (see EN 1137bl7-19); indeed, 
they are indispensable, for they articulate the various kinds of value to 
which the person of practical wisdom is committed. Rather, the nature 
of practical human life is simply such that it sometimes confronts us with 
situations where more than one of these principles could apply. 
18 Roes (1949), 204-5 complains that Aristotle never relates his belief that virtuous 
action is for the sake of the noble to his 'formal theory'. 
19 A form of perception is necessary because there is, for Aristotle, no absolute priority 
of the concerns of one virtue over those of another. 
20 He may discover that one moral principle is the correct one to act on in the course 
of deliberating from another. For a subtle discussion of this aspect of Aristotelian 
deliberation, see Broadie (1991) 232-60. 
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II Nicomachean Ethics VI1 
Aristotle opens book VI with an indication that the accounts of the 
various moral virtues in the preceding books were in some way incom-
plete. We may divide the chapter for our purposes into two parts. 
The first section of the chapter reads as follows: 
Since we have already said that one ought to choose what is interme-
diate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is as the 
correct principle (Xoycx;) tells us, let us discuss this. For in all the states 
we have mentioned, as also in the case of the rest, there is some mark 
(OKO7RO<;) to which the person who possesses the principle (AxJyov) looks 
as he heightens and relaxes his efforts, and there is some standard (op<x;) 
of the mean states (neaoxfjTcov), which we say are in between excess and 
defect, since they are in accordance with the correct principle (Xoyov). 
(113SM8-25) 
If by Xoyoc, in this passage Aristotle means (general) principle, as I think 
he must,21 then Aristotle's point is that, insofar as a person of practical 
wisdom possesses (and uses) such a principle, he aims at some determi-
nate mark (aKorcoq). It is important to see that Aristotle here associates 
this mark with the state, which suggests that the Xoyoc; which states the 
'mark' or aim is a general one and states the goal or end of the virtue. So, 
too, Aristotle tells us that there is a standard of the mean states 
(neaoxriTcov). This standard, then, is general, too; it is, indeed, the same 
thing as the mark or goal of virtue. As we have seen, the end of each 
virtue is the noble in the relevant sphere of experience, and the end of 
moral virtue in general is the noble sans phrase. Now in his discussion of 
the particular virtues, and in his preliminary account of moral virtue in 
general, Aristotle had argued that virtue disposes one to choose the 
21 We must not suppose, on the grounds that the correct X6rfo<-9 tells us the intermediate 
and the intermediate is what is chosen, i.e., a particular action, that Xoytx; here refers 
to the process of reasoning which determines the particular response. Since the 
major premise in a practical syllogism is the evaluative one, Aristotle not uncom-
monly says that it is this that 'tells us' the evaluative conclusion. Thus at EN 1147a34 
we have r[ nev ... Xbfei (peGyeiv zovio where the antecedent of the relative seems 
clearly to be T] jiev KCXOOAOU [8o^a] at 1147a31-2. On the relation of the intermediate 
as general (at the beginning of deliberation) and as particular (at the end of 
deliberation), see note 16 above. 
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intermediate action (and to feel the intermediate feeling) in the relevant 
sphere of human life. Thus intermediacy is a partial explication of the 
general goal towards which the virtues orient us in their respective 
spheres. In itself, however, the notion of the intermediate does not 
provide sufficient content to the noble for it to serve as a mark or aim of 
action and feeling, as Aristotle points out in the second half of our 
chapter. 
TTie rest of the chapter runs as follows: 
But such a statement, though true, is by no means clear. For not only 
here but in all other pursuits of which there is a science (£7ucrefmTi), it is 
indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts 
too much or too little, but to an intermediate extent (xa |ieaa) and as the 
correct principle (Xj&yoc,) tells us. But if one only had this, one would be 
none the wiser; for example, one would be none the wiser about what 
sorts of things should be administered to the body, if someone were to 
say, "all that the medical art bids us, and as the person who possesses 
it directs." Therefore it is necessary with regard to the states of the soul 
also, not only that this true statement should be made, but also that it 
should be determined (Sicopia îevov) what the correct principle is and 
what is its standard (opoq). (113Sb25-34) 
Aristotle here emphasizes that for the principles of the virtues to direct 
our conduct, there must be some standard which determines what the 
noble is in the various fields of human life. That is, there must be some 
standard which supplies content to the nobility referred to in the general 
principles that define the virtues. 
Aristotle is not looking for a standard for applying moral principles 
to particular circumstances. This point must stressed, since some com-
mentators suppose that Aristotle here is merely calling attention to the 
fact that general principles of any sort cannot successfully be applied in 
practice without a trained judgment that is responsive to particulars.22 
22 So, for example, Rowe (1971), 111. Broadie (1991), on the other hand, sees that this 
passage is concerned with the general specification of the goal of virtuous action, 
not with its application to particular circumstances. She rejects, however, any role 
for rules and general principles, maintaining that the general specification Aristotle 
here calls for is simply a description of the person of practical wisdom whom we 
may then seek to emulate (185-90). See 191: '[I]n the end, EN VI aims to present the 
(ppovî ux; as an archetype of the sort of person to try to be/ 
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The use of medicine as an example may seem to corroborate such a 
reading, since medicine is one of the arts that Aristotle elsewhere stresses 
involve more deliberative attention to particular circumstance than 
other, more precise arts (compare EN 1104a5-10,1112b2-8, EE 1247a5-7). 
But this cannot be the point of the medical example here. Aristotle tells 
us that his point holds good for 'all pursuits of which there is a science'; 
we must suppose that he could equally have used one of the more precise 
arts to make his point. This he could have done, if his point is that there 
must be some standard to give determinate content to the general 
principles of any practical or productive science. Nothing would have 
been lost if he had written, for example: 'One would be none the wiser 
about what sorts of things to do to build a house, if someone were to say, 
"all that the housebuilding art bids, and as the possessor of it directs"/23 
Knowing who it is who knows how to build a house is not the same as 
knowing how to build a house. Aristotle's point in this chapter is that 
the incompleteness in moral first principles introduced by their reference 
to nobility or intermediacy cannot be compensated by referring (as was 
done, as a stop-gap, in the definition of moral virtue in EN II 6) to the 
knowledge possessed by the one who possesses those principles. For it 
is in virtue of possessing those principles that the virtuous person has 
the (universal) knowledge24 he does; no amount of dexterity in applying 
them can supply them the content that Aristotle here recognizes they (at 
this point in the investigation) lack. 
23 At EE 1220b27-8 Aristotle claims, on the basis of an eKayojyr), that 'in all [actions, 
scientific as well as non-scientific), the intermediate relative to us is what is best; 
and this is as science (eTuorrinri) and Xoycx; bid/ The sciences surveyed as part of the 
CUAYAYYN include the more precise OIKO&HIIKTI as well as the more deliberative iatpucn 
and K-upepvTvcuori. 
24 That there is a universal component to practical wisdom, distinct from the crucial 
ability to apply these universals to particular circumstances, is clear from EN VI 
1141bl4-15, where Aristotle writes: 'Nor is practical wisdom concerned with uni-
versal only, but it is necessary also to recognize particulars.' So, too, practical 
wisdom in its political employment as noXixucn is divided into a universal compo-
nent (vonoOeriKri) and a component concerned with application to particular circum-
stances (jcoXixiicri narrowly so-called, itself divided into fkyvXetmicft and SucacrciKT)) 
(1141b23-33). Shiner (1979), 381-3 stresses the importance of universal 'for the most 
part' truths for moral deliberation. 
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III The Standard of Moral First Principles: EE VIII3 
As is well known, Aristotle does not, in the course of EN VI, unambigu-
ously provide us with the standard that the first chapter of that book 
shows moral first principles to require.25 At the end of EE VIII3, however, 
Aristotle raises the same question he raises in EN VI l,26 and proceeds to 
identify the sought-for standard. The passage in question begins as 
follows: 
Now since there is a certain standard (opoq) for the doctor, by reference 
to which he judges what is healthy for a body27 and what is not, and 
with reference to which each thing is to be done up to a certain point, 
and if it is done well, it is healthy, but if it is done more or less, it is so 
no longer, so too for the virtuous person, in connection with actions and 
choices of the things naturally good but not choiceworthy, there must 
be some standard (opov) of the possession, choice, and avoidance of 
greatness and littleness28 of wealth and of the gifts of fortune. Now in 
what went before, the answer was given: "as the principle (Xoyo<;) says"; 
but this is as if one were to say, in regard to diet, "as the medical art and 
its principle (Xoyoc) say." This, though true, is not clear. (1249a21-b6) 
As in EN VI 1, so here, in both the practical and the medical cases the 
knowledgeable person approaches the particular case with a general 
25 A brief passage at the end of EN VI does, in my opinion, give the required standard 
(1145a6-ll). Its brevity makes its interpretation especially open to question, how-
ever, so it is methodologically sounder to discuss first the more explicit discussion 
of the standard in EE VIII3. 
26 Many writers think that, despite the manifest similarities to £N VI1, Aristotle in EE 
VIII 3 is concerned not with moral choices, but with some other sort of choices. So 
Ackrill, (1974/1980), 30-1; Broadie (1991), 384-5; Cooper (1978), 135-43; Kraut (1989), 
169-70; and Rowe (1971), 110. The untenability of such an interpretation has been 
shown by Kenny (1978), 182-3, who points out that virtuous action consists precisely 
in using external and bodily goods (= things naturally good) in the best possible 
way, and that EE VIII 3 is concerned with providing the standard for such use. 
27 Reading iryurivov ac^iaii with Fritzsche. 
28 The normative implications of Urmson's 'excess or deficiency' here (Barnes [1984]) 
are out of place, Aristotle never to my knowledge uses rcXfjBcx; for imzpfioXi], nor 
6Xiy6xi)<; for DJce 
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principle (Xoyoq) which states the standard (opoq) he will use in deliber-
ating how to act. Here, too, it is suggested that the principle enjoins one 
to act in some intermediate way — not too much, not too little — but it 
is equally clear that this explication of the standard does not go far 
enough, and that a further determination of its nature is possible and 
needed. Later on in this chapter Aristotle attempts to meet this need. 
Indeed, he gives us two distinct formulations of the standard, each of 
which, as we shall see, contains material essential for the correct under-
standing of Aristotle's position. 
The two formulations Aristotle gives of the standard are as follows: 
(I) Whatever choice and possession of naturally good things 
most produces the contemplation of god29 ..., that is best, and 
this is the noblest standard (otkoq o opoq KoXkxozoq) .... 
(1249bl6-19) 
(II) This is the best standard of the soul (oinoq xfj<̂  yuxf|<; opoq 
apiGxoq), whenever one least perceives the irrational part of 
the soul, as such. (1249b21-3) 
These formulations differ in two ways: (a) (I) presents itself as the 
standard of the 'choice and possession of naturally good things', while 
(II) presents itself as the standard of 'the soul'; and (b) (I) specifies the 
standard as 'the contemplation of god', while (II) specifies it as 'least 
perceiving the irrational part of the soul, as such'. If we grant that 
together these formulations are meant to give the standard of moral 
virtue as a whole, as the end of the chapter clearly states,30 then we 
might account for (a) by supposing that (I) gives the standard for the 
virtues concerned with 'naturally good things': magnanimity, magnifi-
cence, liberality; while (II) gives the standard for the virtues concerned 
with the passions of the irrational soul: courage, temperance, gentleness 
of temper.31 Such a division between 'outer' and 'inner' virtues, how-
29 I read the transmitted text at 1249bl7(xTivTo\>8€o\>0£<i>p{av)and I249b2(M (xovGeov 
9epa7i£\)£iv Kai 9ea>peiv), not the conjectures of Robinson adopted by Mingay in the 
recent OCT. 
30 'Let it have been said, then, what the standard (opo;) of noble-goodness (jcoXoica-
yaOiou;) is, and what the aim (<TKOJC6<;) of the things good without qualification is' 
(1249b23-5). 
31 This is the interpretation of Kenny (1978), 183. 
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ever, is attested nowhere else in Aristotle, and seems to me fundamen-
tally unaristotelian. For Aristotle, every moral virtue is concerned with 
'feelings and actions';32 the paradigmatic activity of moral virtue is the 
choice as to how to use some external or bodily good to achieve the 
noble, a choice which, as an ope^iq, has an affective dimension and 
counts as a TiaOoq.33 It is more plausible, then, to suppose that these two 
formulations refer to the 'inner' and 'outer' aspect of each of the moral 
virtues. 
Both actions and feelings admit of excess, deficiency, and the 
intermediate amount; it is reasonable to suppose that we could formu-
late the standard of the virtuous mean in two ways, one with respect 
to feelings, the other with respect to actions. However, if these two 
formulations apply to the same virtues, then they must dictate, in 
particular cases, actions and feelings appropriate to one another. To 
put it another way: they must determine the affective and the external 
aspects of the very same action. Thus we are led to consider (b): the 
difference in the content of the standard offered in the two formulations 
quoted above. (I) tells us that we should choose and keep naturally 
good things in such a way as best to promote the contemplation of 
god; (II) tells us that we should least perceive the irrational part of the 
soul, as such. Since these are alternative formulations of the same 
standard, we may conclude that the feelings that enable us least to 
perceive the irrational part of the soul as such are those that accompany 
the dealings with external and bodily goods that best promote the 
contemplation of god. 
Now to say that certain feelings enable us least to perceive the irra-
tional part of the soul as such is to say something like: these feelings are 
the least irrational we could have. This notion in itself is hardly perspicu-
ous; our only clue to its meaning is that the actions of which these feelings 
are a part best promote the contemplation of god. I suggest, then, that 
these feelings count as least irrational because they least prevent one 
from engaging in the contemplation of god. What makes certain uses of 
naturally good things virtuous is that the feelings that motivate and 
accompany them are such as least to impede the exercise of theoretical 
32 See EN 1106b24-5: '[Moral] virtue is concerned with feelings and actions (rcepl mOn 
icai 7ipa£ei<;).' 
33 For further discussion of the affective aspects of moral choice, see Tuozzo (1994). 
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wisdom. On this interpretation, the virtues derive their value from being 
the developed states that produce such feelings and such actions.34 
The claim that certain 7td9r| may impede contemplation more than 
others, and that the psychic states that produce the former are the moral 
virtues, stands in need of further explication, to which I shall turn 
shortly. First, however, I should like to point out that my interpretation 
of the way in which theoretical contemplation may be a standard for the 
moral virtues escapes an objection normally raised against such inter-
pretations. It is said that, if contemplation is made the standard of 
virtuous action, then whatever action in a particular situation best 
promotes the conditions of contemplation is the morally virtuous one. It 
would seem to follow that if a theft would enable an otherwise destitute 
philosopher to live a life of contemplative leisure, that theft has a good 
claim to being the morally virtuous action in these circumstances. Such 
an absurdity would follow, however, only if the way in which an action 
promoted contemplation was irrelevant. On the current interpretation, 
what must be considered is the effect of the feelings or rca9r| associated 
with an action on the possibility of contemplation. We might put the 
standard, as I understand it, in the following terms: that action which 
best promotes the internal, psychic conditions of theoretical contempla-
tion is the morally virtuous action. The fact that an action will procure 
the money, the time, or anything else from among what may be termed 
the 'external conditions' of contemplative activity is irrelevant to its 
moral worth. 
What are the psychic conditions of contemplation, and how can the 
TcdOrj associated with upa^tc; promote or impede those conditions? Aris-
totle gives us no answer to this question in EE VIII 3, but an important 
clue can be found in a passage in the Magna Moralia, a work that almost 
all scholars agree is based on an Aristotelian lecture course in ethics, 
whether it was substantially written by Aristotle himself or by a pupil/35 
The Magna Moralia describes the relationship between cppovticnc; and 
ao(pia as follows: 
34 One benefit of my interpretation is that it gives a good sense to a phrase in EE VIII 
3 that has resisted understanding and so prompted editors and translators from 
Ross to Woods to resort to emendation. See appendix. 
35 For two discussions of this question, and references to further discussion, see 
Cooper (1973) and Kenny (1978), 216-20. 
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Perhaps cppovriaiq is like an estate-manager in a household. This person 
has authority over everything and manages everything; but he does not 
for all that rule over everything, but provides leisure (o%oA.r|v) to the 
master, so that the latter may not, hindered by necessities, be prevented 
from doing some noble and fitting thing. In this way and similarly to 
him, <ppovTi<Ji<; is as it were an estate-manager for aocpia and furnishes 
it with leisure (a%o f̂)v) and the chance to perform its own work, by 
restraining the passions (jcaOTi) and making them temperate 
(ooxppovi^ouaa). (1198bl3-20) 
What this passage adds to the account in EE VIII 3 is the notion of a 
certain leisure for contemplation, provided by cppovnaic; through its 
control of the passions in virtuous action.36 Now since it is presumably 
impossible both to contemplate and to act morally (or immorally) at the 
same time, the leisure in question must be leisure from action in general. 
Since all action is prompted, and accompanied, by 7id0r| of some kind 
(ope^tq being here included), it would seem that virtuous action pro-
motes contemplation by effecting an absence of action-oriented passion. 
It does so, I suggest, by fully exhausting, as it were, the 7ca&r| connected 
with it. Actions proceeding from a vicious character, on this view, will 
tend to leave some passionate residue in the agent — unsatisfied appe-
tite, regret, etc. — which pushes the agent to action once again. Virtuous 
action will not leave such residue: the affective component of the action 
is exhausted in the action, without producing any further affect that 
impels one to act further. Virtuous actions are thus what we may call 
'affectively complete', and result in the psychic leisure from action-
prompting affect required for contemplation. 
The affective completeness of virtuous actions reflects, I suggest, their 
more fundamental metaphysical completeness. The moral virtues are 
perfections or completions of our essential potentialities to feel and act 
(cf. Physics 247a2). Their actualizations, virtuous actions, will accord-
ingly also be complete. In the terms Aristotle uses in Metaphysics 6 6, 
36 It has been suggested that the role here ascribed to <pp6vriaiq either is quite distinct 
from its role in virtuous action, or is only part of its role in virtuous action. The use 
of the term aoxppovi^ouoa, however, strongly suggests that the role here described 
is a moral one, and the comparison with the estate-manager suggests that it is its 
sole function. 
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these actions are Tcpâ eiq and evepyeiai because, unlike Kivrjaei<;, they 
contain their own ends within themselves (1048b22-3). On the interpre-
tation here offered, vicious actions will be more like Kivriaeiq than 
svepyeiai. A vicious person may indeed choose some action for its own 
sake, but the m&ri that motivate and accompany the action will not find 
adequate expression in that action. In some form or other a psychic 
residue will remain, such that the agent is directed toward further 
action.37 If this is so, then there is a relatively straightforward sense in 
which we may use Aristotle's account of the noble in Metaphysics M to 
give content to the claim that virtuous action is chosen for the sake of the 
noble. At Metaphysics 1078a37-bl Aristotle writes, 'The three forms (ei'Srt) 
of the noble are order, proportion, and determinateness (TO wpio^evov).' 
The self-containedness and completeness of the ixdcOrj involved in virtu-
ous actions reflects their metaphysical determinateness, which is the 
ultimate ground of their nobility. 
IV Psychic Leisure and Particular Moral Virtues 
The above account has emerged from an investigation into the more 
theoretical passages in Aristotle's work concerning the nature of moral 
virtue. It is an open question whether Aristotle's discussions of the 
particular moral virtues will prove in every respect consistent with this 
account; Aristotle's sensitive exploration of the right ways of feeling and 
acting in different spheres of human life may well produce results in 
tension with his official account of their relation to primary e\)5ai^ovia. 
Indeed, I suspect that this is the case. Nonetheless, I believe that Aris-
totle's discussion of a number of virtues and vices can be seen to conform 
to the general account of virtue offered here, and that, furthermore, it is 
plausible to suppose that Aristotle felt that the investigation of the 
virtues from starting points provided by moral experience would ulti-
37 Garver (1989) offers an interpretation along somewhat the same lines: 'Virtuous 
actions are the only evepyeiai of the irrational but persuadable part of the soul that 
fit Aristotle's sense of complete £V£pyeia in the Metaphysics, evepycia as opposed to 
incomplete Kivriau;' (303). Garver, however, holds that vicious actions are incom-
plete in the sense of being in some sense indeterminate or arbitrary (see 303-4), while 
I hold that they are incomplete in the sense of prompting the agent on to further 
action. 
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mately prove consistent with his account of their relationship to contem-
plation. In this section I shall show how at least some of Aristotle's 
accounts of particular virtues and vices can be seen to conform to his 
general account of virtue. 
The easiest case is perhaps that of self-indulgence (aKotaxaia). The 
self-indulgent person values certain bodily pleasures 'more than they 
are worth' (EN 1119al9-20); indeed, he holds that the more of them he 
gets, the better, as the following passage indicates: 
If, then, [the part of the soul that desires pleasure! is not going to be 
obedient and subject to the ruling part of the soul, it shall increase; for 
in a thoughtless thing the desire for what is pleasant is insatiable and 
draws gratification from any place it can, and the activity of appetite 
increases its natural force. (EN 1119b7-9) 
The experience of bodily pleasure does not satisfy the desire of the 
self-indulgent person, who must always be concerned to procure more 
such pleasure, else feel the pain of unsatisfied desire (cf. EN 1119a3-5). 
Two other vices that seem to have the same structure as self-indul-
gence are prodigality (aaoxia) and illiberality (dveA^uOepia). Prodigal 
persons 'have an appetite for giving' (EN 1121b2), and in their need to 
satisfy this appetite most of them do not scruple to acquire the necessary 
funds from any source possible, no matter how ignoble. Their desire to 
give is not fully satisfied by any particular act of giving, but remains to 
drive them on to further, indiscriminate largesse. So, too, all three types 
of illiberal person distinguished by Aristotle have one feature in com-
mon: they are lovers of money (cpiAxxxprmaxoi, EN 1121bl5) who never 
think that they have enough. 
A vice with a somewhat more complex structure is rashness. 'Rash 
persons (01... Opaoeiq)/ Aristotle tells us, 'are precipitate, and are quite 
willing before dangers, but draw back when they are in them, while 
brave persons are keen in their deeds, but calm beforehand' (EN 1116a7-
9). The brave feel the appropriate k&Bck; at the time of action, but feel no 
na8o<; beforehand, nor, we may assume, afterwards. The rash, however, 
feel confidence before battle, but during battle experience overwhelming 
fear. This change of 7cd0o<; thwarts the original xidGoq, which remains 
unfulfilled. The desire to be bold in danger reasserts itself when the 
danger is past, so that the rash person, as such, continues to feel an 
impetus to seek out dangerous situations in which to be bold. 
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The vice of 'insensibility' (dvaioOriata) is perhaps the most difficult 
to understand in terms of Aristotle's general account of virtue and vice. 
Insensible persons 'delight less than is right' in bodily pleasures (EN 
1119a6); in what way can they be held to be caught up in a chain of 7ta&r| 
that never gives them psychic leisure? '[S]uch insensibility/ Aristotle 
says 'is not human; for even the other animals discriminate among their 
foodstuffs, and rejoice in some and not in others; and if nothing is 
pleasant to someone and one thing is the same as another to him, he 
would be far from being a human being' (EN 1119a6-10). The insensible 
person is here depicted as someone who finds nothing pleasant. His 
inevitable physical desires, therefore, he must experience as mere pain, 
and the satisfaction of them as in some way merely relief from pain. If 
Aristotle holds that such a treatment of physical desires will not in fact 
do justice to them, so that the insensible man continues to feel an 
indefinite urge, in spite of himself, to satisfy them more fully, then this 
vice, too, can be seen to conform to the general account of virtue as 
providing the psychic leisure necessary for contemplation. 
V A Problem 
There is another obvious objection to my account of the relation of 
contemplation to the moral virtues that must be addressed. Aristotle 
clearly supposes that contemplation requires intellectual gifts that many 
persons perfectly capable of moral virtue lack. How can, and why 
should, an activity which these persons can never perform serve as the 
standard — even an indirect standard — for their practical dispositions? 
This question is, I suggest, in some respects ill-conceived. It supposes 
that, on the interpretation here offered, the moral virtues are valuable 
merely instrumentally, insofar as they help bring about contemplation. 
Having no value in themselves, they would be pointless if one did not 
have the intellectual prerequisites for theoretical activity. Such a view 
overlooks the fact that morally virtuous activity is the excellent actuali-
zation of human capacities, and is as such intrinsically valuable, whether 
the contemplation which serves as its standard ever occurs or not.38 
38 See EN 1144al-3: 'Let us say first of all that these [viz., «ppovriat<; and aocpia] are of 
necessity choiceworthy in themselves, since each is the virtue of one part [sc. of the 
rational faculty], even if neither of them produces anything.' 
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Contemplation determines what counts as the best states of the irrational 
part of the soul of all human beings, whatever their individual skills at 
theory. 
A question may still seem to arise for the case of the morally virtuous 
person who is incapable of contemplation. The moral virtues are those 
states that enable one 'least to perceive the irrational part of the soul, 
as such/ Such a condition frees those capable of contemplation from 
domination by their naQr\ and thus gives them the psychic freedom to 
contemplate. How do those incapable of contemplation use this psychic 
freedom? Such persons should play an active role in politics. Political 
life will enable them to exercise their practical wisdom and moral 
virtues on a grander scale, and since such activity is the highest of 
which they are capable, their lives are better to the extent that they 
engage in greater practical projects. And in those projects contempla-
tion will continue to serve as an indirect standard. The politician's 
central aim is to make the citizens virtuous:39 that is, to produce in 
them the interior psychic conditions for contemplation. (He is con-
cerned with the safety and prosperity of the city derivatively, as the 
material conditions of virtue.) Those citizens who are capable of 
contemplation will (in the ideal case) become philosophers; those who 
are not will in their turn become politicians. 
VI Conclusion 
Aristotle, then, provides a non-moral foundation for morality. He does 
so not by making moral action a matter of directly maximizing some 
non-moral good, but rather by holding that moral action gets its worth 
from promoting a certain inner state of the agent that is a necessary 
pre-condition of fully engaging in a non-moral activity of supreme 
worth: theoretical contemplation.40 Each of the moral virtues is a dispo-
sition towards noble actions in a particular sphere of human experience, 
39 See EN 1102a7-10: The true politician seems to have labored most in connection 
with this [sc. virtue); for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the 
laws/ 
40 The paradox that in Aristotle's theory of the good something may derive its intrinsic 
value from something else is addressed in Tuozzo (1995). 
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and this commitment is expressible in a general rule that serves as the 
starting point for deliberation concerned with acting in that sphere. 
Noble actions in each sphere do not exemplify some primitive value, but 
rather derive their value from being the actions that fully exhaust their 
passionate components and so effect the psychic leisure that is the 
pre-condition for contemplation. 
This is the account of virtue that emerges from following out Aris-
totle's more theoretical remarks on the nature and value of virtue. But 
we have seen that Aristotle's sensitive examination of the world of moral 
experience leads to accounts of the particular virtues that are in a degree 
of tension with this more theoretical account. Given the somewhat 
questionable nature of both Aristotle's insistence on the metaphysical 
unity of human beings and his view that theoretical contemplation is the 
human activity of highest worth, it is perhaps understandable that 
contemporary ethicists influenced by Aristotle emphasise his recogni-
tion of the richness of moral life and his notion of virtue as a receptivity 
to value (and a disposition to effect it) in the many spheres of experience, 
while ignoring the foundation of Aristotelian moral virtue in its relation 
to contemplation. Nonetheless, we must not make the mistake of sup-
posing that the connection to contemplation is a merely external feature 
of Aristotle's ethics. It is Aristotle's sole and unrepudiated account of the 
source of the value of moral virtue and virtuous actions. Any ethics that 
rejects it must produce an alternative theory to undergird the insights 
into moral experience it may borrow from Aristotle.41 
41 I would like to thank Roger Shiner for the helpful criticisms and comments he gave 
me on an earlier version of this paper, and Janet Sisson for her helpful comments 
on the penultimate version. Their comments have helped make this paper better 
than it was, though it still may not convince them. 
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Appendix 
At the beginning of his argument in EE VIII 3 for the two formulations 
of the standard discussed in section III above, Aristotle writes: 'Certainly 
it is necessary, as in other cases, too, to live with reference to the ruling 
element, and with reference to the state in accordance with the activity 
of the ruling element (rcp6<; TT]V E^TV ICAIA rqv evepyeiav rqv zov ap%ovxoq), 
as the slave does with reference to that of the master' (1249b7-9). The 
obscurity of the phrase 'state in accordance with the activity' has led 
recent editors and translators to adopt Ross's emendation of rata to KOCI, 
producing 'one must... live ... with reference to the state and the activity 
of the ruling element.'42 But the transmitted text is apt as it stands. It is 
not directly from the activity of contemplation that the moral virtues 
derive any of their content, but rather from 'the state in accordance with 
that activity', the state in which the potentially irrational passions of the 
soul do not deflect us from theoretical activity.43 Similarly, the slave does 
not derive the content of his best condition and work directly from the 
nature of the master's occupation, e.g., political activity.44 Rather the 
slave's work derives its content from the state which the master must 
find himself in if he is to be able to engage in his rightful occupation: a 
state free from the impediments to that occupation arising from the need 
to provide for the necessities of life for himself and his household. Slaves 
and moral virtue are, in Aristotle's thought, enabling conditions for the 
relevant activities they support, not collaborators in them. 
42 Ross (apud Solomon's original Oxford translation, footnote ad loc.), retained in the 
revised Oxford translation, and followed by Dirlmeier (1963), Mingay (1991), and 
Woods (1992). 
43 Verdenius (1971), 285-97, followed by D&rarie (1978), 224 n. 92, retains the transmit-
ted text, but gives it a sense opposite to mine, viz., 'with reference to the active state 
of the ruling factor' (285). This makes e£iv Kaxaxriv evepyeiav merely periphrasis for 
evepyeiav, which I do not think can be right. The contrast between and £vepyeia 
is crucial here, just as it is in EN 1122bl, which, though cited by Verdenius (1971), 
287, does not seem to support his point. 
44 Or philosophic activity, as the case may be; see Politics 1255b35-7. 
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